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Abstract
The search literature assumes that consumers know which firms sell
products they are looking for, but are unaware of the particular variety
and the prices at which each firm sells. In this paper, we consider the
situation where consumers are uncertain whether a firm carries the
product at all by proposing a model where in the first stage firms
decide on whether or not to carry the product. Firms may advertise,
informing consumers not only of the price they charge, but also of the
basic fact that they sell the product. In this way, advertising lowers the
expected search cost. We show that this role of advertising can lead
to a situation where advertised prices are higher than non-advertised
prices in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Imagine yourself attending a conference in a foreign country. You sit with
your laptop in your hotel room and you realize that when your battery
expires you cannot charge it because of a different electricity outlet system.
You are going out in town to search for an electricity converter. You enter
a first, electronics, shop where the charming sales representative tells you
that unfortunately they do not carry such an item in their store. The same
story repeats in a number of stores, after which you disappointingly go
back to the hotel. In a last desperate attempt you ask at the hotel lobby
whether they by any chance would know a shop where they carry the item
you are looking for. Triumphantly, the clerk at the desk tells you a firm has
left an advertisement behind informing people that they carry all different
types of electronic converters one may ever wish to use (possibly with the
prices at which they sell). You are very happy for this piece of information,
immediately go to the shop and are prepared to buy at any (somewhat
reasonable) price.
This story contains an element that we believe is important in many mar-
kets, not just when hanging around in far away destinations: namely that a
large part of the search activities of people is not about ”searching for firms
with the lowest price”, but rather about ”searching for firms that sell the
product”. This distinction has not been made in the economics literature on
consumer search. The typical search model only considers situations where
all firms in the market carry the product and the only reason for consumers
to search (further) is to look for a price-quality combination that better fits
the individual’s preferences. That is, the literature on consumer search is
not about the ”real” search activity of consumers when they are uncertain
about which firms carry the product.
Another important aspect of the above story is that a potential important
role of advertising is simply to inform consumers about the fact that the
advertising firm carries the product, thereby helping the consumer to save
on his expected search cost. If the uncertainty about which firm carries
the product one is looking for is very large, then the reduction in ”real”
search cost may be quite significant. This in turn may help advertising
firms to charge (substantially) higher prices and in this way recover the ad-
vertising expenditures. In this way, so the present paper argues, advertised
prices may actually be higher than non-advertised prices. This is contrary to
conventional wisdom expressed in the literature on informative advertising,
according to which informative price advertising leads to better informed
consumers, and therefore, to more competition and lower prices (see, e.g.,
Farris and Albion (1980) and Tirole (1998, section 7.3)). Thus, the paper
contributes to the strategic literature on advertising by arguing that in the
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presence of uncertainty about which firms sell the product, informative price
advertising may lead to higher prices compared to the non-advertised prices.
This insight is important in empirical work on advertising. It shows that one
should be careful to conclude from an observed positive correlation between
advertising and prices that advertising is persuasive, see e.g. Boulding et al.
(1994) and Clark (2005).1
This paper studies ”searching for the product” and ”high prices through
informative advertising” in relation. To this end, we develop a three-stage
model. In the first stage, firms decide whether or not they want to allocate
shelve-space to a particular type of product. Doing so has an opportunity
cost of not using that space for having some other commodity on display.
We call all firms who decide to carry the product ”active firms”. In the
second stage, active firms decide on their price and on whether they advertise
the fact that they carry the product (and the price at which they sell it)
by sending an advertisement to consumers. For simplicity, advertising is
modeled as an all-or-nothing decision.2 In the third stage, after potentially
having received some ads, consumers decide whether or not to search for a
firm that carries the product, with a potentially lower price than the firms
that advertised. However, if the firm has not advertised, the consumer does
not know whether or not the firm carries the product in the first place.
The simplest search model we can imagine that makes the point that ad-
vertised prices can be higher than non-advertised prices, even under infor-
mative price advertisement, has two types of consumers: low demand con-
sumers have search cost cL, whereas high demand consumers have higher
search cost cH . One may think of the high demand consumers as having
high income from demanding jobs to justify the correlation between the size
of consumers’ search cost and their willingness to pay. In such a model,
there may be many different types of equilibria, depending on the parame-
ter configurations. We focus on equilibria where advertised prices are higher
than non-advertised prices. The simplest such equilibrium has the follow-
ing structure. As soon as consumers receive advertisements, they buy at
the advertising firm. When the low demand consumers get no advertise-
ment, they search for an active firm. High demand consumers who get no
advertisements however do not search for an active firm as they find the
probability that these firms do not carry the product too high compared to
1An interesting method to empirically distinguish between informative and persuasive
advertising is proposed by Ackerberg (2001). He argues that informative advertising
mainly influences inexperienced buyers, since informative advertising provides these buyers
with the information they need. Persuasive advertising, on the other hand, will influence
both experienced and inexperienced buyers.
2Otherwise, complications arise of the form that a firm from which no advertisement
has been received, may be either a firm that did not advertise or a firm that advertises
but whose advertisement is simply not received.
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the search costs they have to make. Non-advertising firms therefore com-
pletely concentrate on the low demand consumers, whereas advertising firms
concentrate on both types. The probability that firms are active and the in-
tensity with which active firms advertise are determined in such a way that
firms are indifferent between being inactive, advertising high prices and not-
advertising and setting low prices. To be able to make firms indifferent we
impose a condition on the proportion of high and low valuation consumers
in the population.
The paper is, of course, related to the large literatures on consumer search
and advertising (see, e.g., the seminal papers by Stigler (1961), Stahl (1989,
1994), Butters, (1977)). The main difference with the consumer search lit-
erature is, as we mentioned, the fact that consumers really have to search
for the good if firms do not advertise, as firms may not carry the product.
Contributing to the strategic literature on advertising, Meurer and Stahl
(1994) are the first to note that informative advertising may lead to higher
prices. Soberman (2004) also outlines a model where informative advertising
and prices can be positively correlated. In both Meurer and Stahl (1994)
and Soberman (2004) products are assumed to be heterogenous. Informa-
tive advertising plays two roles in this context. First, it creates awareness of
products so that consumers know what best fits their tastes. This strength-
ens the product differentiation aspect, giving firms an incentive to raise
prices. On the other hand, it also leads to more consumers with full infor-
mation and this gives firms an incentive to reduce prices. When product
differentiation is important enough, the first aspect is more important than
the second so that advertising can lead to price increases. To contrast our
results with these two papers, we present a model where products are ho-
mogeneous. The channel through which advertising leads to higher prices
in the present paper, as described above, is therefore completely different in
our model.
The literature that combines consumer search and advertising is much more
limited.3 Robert and Stahl (1993) is the first paper where consumers’ igno-
rance about prices can be resolved by consumers searching for prices or by
firms informing consumers about the prices they charge through advertising.
Following on their work, Stahl (2000) and Janssen and Non (2005) check the
robustness of the model by investigating the properties of different modeling
assumptions. Janssen and Non assume that a fraction of consumers is fully
3Apart from the literature mentioned here, there is also a recent paper by Stivers and
Tremblay (2005). Their model is however very different from the standard search models
as they model search costs as the wedge between producer prices and consumer prices, very
much like the analysis in traditional tax studies. Moreover, they assume that advertising
lowers the search costs of consumers. In such a world, they show that it is possible that
advertising raises the price the firms ask, while at the same time decreasing the price
(including search costs) that consumers have to pay.
3
informed about prices and that less-informed consumers can both decide
to search and to buy at firms that advertise. Under these conditions they
characterize all equilibria of the model and show that in some equilibria
advertised prices may be higher than non-advertised prices. They, however,
make the unrealistic assumption that less-informed consumers can buy at
firms that advertise without incurring search cost, giving advertising firms
an advantage above non-advertising firms that have to be searched for. In
the present paper we formally explain how this difference in search cost to
buy from an advertising and a non-advertising firm can emerge out of the
uncertainty consumers face when they visit a shop that did not advertise.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 formally characterizes one equilibrium where advertised prices are
higher than non-advertised prices. In section 4 we will elaborate on the
existence of other equilibria. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we will specify the three-stage model we use. We assume a
homogenous good oligopoly, with n ≥ 2 firms in the market. For simplicity,
the firms have no production costs, but there is an opportunity cost C for
shelving the product. In the first stage of the model the firms decide on
whether or not to carry the product. We will denote the probability of a
firm being active by β. Note that an inactive firm has profit 0.
In the ”second stage” of the model, firms decide simultaneously on their
advertising strategy and price. Firms do not know the outcome of the first
stage (the decision to be active) and therefore, it is just as if firms play
these two stages simultaneously. An active firm can decide to advertise
that it sells the product and at which price. Note here that advertising
is purely informative: an advertisement informs about existence and price.
Advertising is an ’all-or-nothing’ decision, that is, a firm either advertises
to the complete market or does not advertise at all. The cost of advertising
is A. We will denote the probability with which a firm advertises by α.
The pricing strategy depends on whether a shop advertises or not. We
will therefore specify a price strategy conditional on advertising and a price
strategy conditional on not advertising. Denote by p1 the highest advertised
price, and by p
1
the lowest advertised price. Prices of non-advertising firms
are denoted by p0.
There is a unit mass of consumers, who can be divided into two types. A
fraction γ has a low demand L− p and low search costs cL. A fraction 1−γ
has a high demand H − p and high search costs cH . Note that H > L and
cH > cL and that demand is linear in prices p. In the third stage of the game,
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consumers receive the advertisements that are sent and decide on their search
strategy. Consumers search sequentially; conditional on the advertisements
that are sent. Sequential search means that the consumers first look at the
advertisements they have received. They then decide whether or not to visit
one additional firm. After visiting this firm they decide on whether or not
to visit a second firm, and so on. Note that consumers only search non-
advertising firms, since they already know that advertising firms are active
and the ad also tells at which price the active firm sells. We assume that
every visit to a firm costs cL (cH). Visiting an advertising firm, a consumer
has to make the search costs, but is sure he will find the product. Visiting
a non-advertising firm, a consumer has to make the same search costs, but
in this case is not sure he will find the product. This implies that the ’real’
search costs for searching a non-advertising firm is higher than the search
costs for searching an advertising firm.
We look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game. In such an equilib-
rium, the consumer strategy in principle depends on the full set of advertised
prices that the consumer has seen. However, the only part of this set of ad-
vertised prices that is important in making the decision whether or not to
search is the lowest observed price, since consumers would never buy from
an advertising firm if they have seen an ad from another firm with a lower
price. We can therefore specify the consumer strategy in terms of the low-
est observed price. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs are not really important in
this game as firms do not come in different types, i.e., they all sell the same
commodity. Consumers, however, do update their beliefs (using Bayes’ rule)
about the probability the firm carries the product after not having received
an advertisement. As we will see, this occurs with positive probability along
the equilibrium path.
3 An equilibrium
The model that has been specified above has many possible equilibria. In
this section we will characterize one of the more interesting ones in which
advertising firms set higher prices than non-advertising firms. For such an
equilibrium to exist we must have that 0 < β < 1 and 0 < α < 1. An
equilibrium with β = 0 would mean there is no market at all, while β = 1
would bring us back to a standard search model where consumers are sure
that every firm is active. If α = 0 or α = 1, we can not compare advertised
and non-advertised prices.
For different parameter values there are also potentially different equilib-
ria with advertising firms unambiguously setting higher prices than non-
advertising firms. To have this it is clear that non-advertising firms should
focus their pricing decision on a group of consumers that has on average
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more low type consumers than the group of consumers the advertising firms
focus on. In this section, we concentrate on such a case, namely where
consumers choose the following search strategy.
Assumption 3.1 (Consumer Search Strategy). All consumers who get an
advertisement with a price at or below 12(γL+ (1− γ)H) do not search for
non-advertising firms and buy immediately from the lowest priced advertising
firm L−p or H−p units, respectively.4 Low demand consumers who get no
advertisements search for a non-advertising firm carrying the product. They
search on until they find an active firm, and as soon as they found one with
price at or below 12L, they will buy there.
5 High demand consumers who get
no advertisements do not search, and as a consequence do not buy.
Given this strategy of the consumers, we claim that the optimal pricing, ad-
vertising and activity strategy of the firms is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2 If consumers follow the search strategy specified in Assumption
3.1 and H < (1+ 1√
1−γ )L, then the following forms the optimal response for
firms. Non-advertising firms set a price p0 = 12L. Advertising firms choose
a price according to a price distribution with cdf
F1(p) =
1
αβ
− 1− αβ
αβ
(
(γL+ (1− γ)H)2
4p(γL+ (1− γ)H − p))
1
n−1 ,
with p1 =
1
2(γL+(1−γ)H). Lastly, the probability with which firms advertise
α and their activity probability β are implicitly defined by
(1− αβ)n−1 = 4(C +A)
(γL+ (1− γ)H)2
and
γL2
C +A
(γL+ (1− γ)H)2 = C + C(n− 1)
β(1− α)
1− αβ .
Proof
See appendix. 2
4It is more difficult to specify fully rational behavior in case the lowest observed ad-
vertised price is above 1
2
(γL + (1 − γ)H). For the derivation of the equilibrium it is not
necessary to specify the consumer behavior in this case, since even if the consumers would
buy immediately after seeing such a high price, firms would not deviate. Therefore, we
do not fully specify consumer behavior for this case. We will provide more details in the
proof of lemma 3.2.
5Here the same applies as in footnote 4.
6
The consumer search behavior that is assumed, gives advertising firms the
possibility to ask a higher price than non-advertising firms. As non-advertising
firms only sell to the low demand consumers and since they do not compete
with one another, it is optimal for them to ask the monopoly price given low
demand. Setting an advertising price that is higher than the non-advertised
price, both consumer types still would buy from the advertising firm. Since
advertising firms sell to both consumer types, one of the optimal prices, the
maximum price, is a weighted average of 12L, the optimal price when only
selling to the low demand consumers, and 12H, the optimal price when only
selling to the high demand consumers. However, as advertising firms also
compete with one another (in case there are two or more firms advertis-
ing), the mixed strategy price distribution optimally balances the monopoly
power they may have with the possibility they compete with each other. The
condition H < (1 + 1√
1−γ )L is used to guarantee that an advertising firm
wants to serve both types of demand and not concentrate its sales activities
on the high demand consumers only. The condition requires H/L not to be
too large and γ, the proportion of low demand consumers, to be relatively
large.
We now turn to check the optimality of the assumed consumer strategy.
Lemma 3.3 Suppose that 1−αβ(1−α)β >
(L− 1
2
L)2
(L− γL+(1−γ)H
2
)2
and H < 2−γ1−γL. Given
the strategy of firms specified in the previous lemma, there are values of cL
and cH , with cH > cL, such that the optimal search and buying strategy of
consumers is as given in assumption 3.1.
Proof
See appendix. 2
There are several parameter restrictions for the consumer search strategy to
be optimal. In the proof of the previous lemma, we have specified several
restrictions on the search cost parameters cL and cH . Both search cost
parameters have a lower bound and an upper bound. The upper bound on
the search costs follows from the fact that consumers are assumed to buy
immediately after receiving an advertisement. If the cost of buying from an
advertising firm is too high, a consumer would prefer not to buy at all. On
the other hand, when getting an ad, consumers do not search on. This leads
to a lower bound on the search costs, since if search costs were negligibly
small, consumers would continue to search for another active firm, even after
receiving ads.
Next to the upper and lower bound on search costs that originate from the
behavior of consumers who get an ad, there is an extra upper bound on
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the search costs for the low demand consumers and an extra lower bound
on the high demand consumers’ search costs. These bounds originate from
the behavior of the consumers who do not receive an ad. Low demand
consumers who do not receive advertisements decide to search. This gives
a second upper bound on cL, since if the search costs are too high, it is not
profitable to search. In the proof it is shown that this second upper bound
is below the upper bound that originates from the fact that consumers who
get an ad buy immediately at the advertising firm: the expected surplus
from searching after not having received an ad apparently is lower than the
surplus from buying at an advertising firm, even though the advertised price
can be high. The reason is that searching consumers have a strictly positive
probability of not finding an active firm.
High demand consumers who do not receive advertisements do not search.
This gives a second lower bound on cH , since for really low search costs
these consumers would prefer to search. This second lower bound is above
the lower bound that originates from consumers who received ads. To see
this, note that the second bound says that cH should be higher than the
expected surplus from searching without having received any ads. The other
lower bound says that cH should be higher than the expected surplus from
searching after having received some advertisements. This surplus is below
the surplus from searching when no advertisements have been received.
The condition 1−αβ(1−α)β >
(L− 1
2
L)2
(L− γL+(1−γ)H
2
)2
mentioned in the lemma takes care
of the fact that one is able to find search cost parameters cL and cH such
that the search conditions discussed above can be satisfied. Next to the
restrictions on the search costs, there is a second restriction, H < 2−γ1−γL,
which simply guarantees that low demand consumers are willing to buy
even at the maximum price advertised as specified in their search strategy.
After this discussion on the conditions pertaining to the optimality of the
consumer search strategy, we are now ready to state the full equilibrium in
which advertising firms set higher prices than non-advertising firms. In addi-
tion to the conditions specified in the previous two lemmas, the equilibrium
requires that 0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1.
Proposition 3.4 If γ > 4C
L2
and H < (1 + 1√
1−γ )L, then there are values
of cL and cH , with cH > cL, and values of n > 2 and A > 0 such that the
strategies of firms and consumers specified in the previous two lemmas form
a perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium, with 0 < α, β < 1.
Proof
See appendix. 2
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The equilibrium we specified has indeed the feature that advertised prices
are above the non-advertised price. Even so, consumers who receive an
advertisement do not search for the lower priced non-advertising firms. The
reason is that they do not know which firms are active and which firms are
not. Possibly, a consumer has to search many times, making a lot of search
costs, in order to find an active firm. The alternative is to pay search costs
once, to be able to buy at a high price for sure.
The equilibrium we characterized holds under some restrictions. In the proof
we formally characterize upper and lower bounds for both advertising costs
A and the shelving costs C. This is quite intuitive, since in equilibrium
firms are indifferent between advertising and not advertising and between
being active and not active. If the advertising costs are too high, no firm
would advertise, while if the advertising costs are too small, every active
firm would advertise destroying the incentives to search as in this case all
non-advertising firms are inactive. In the same way, if the shelving costs are
too high, no firm would be active, while if the shelving costs are too small,
every firm would be active.
Another restriction, namely γ > 4C
L2
, can be understood as follows. A non-
advertising firm makes its maximum profit when it is the only active firm,
and in that case profits equal 14γL
2. Since we impose that in equilibrium at
least some firms are active, these profits should be higher than the shelving
costs C, leading to a lower bound on γ. If this condition holds, the proof
shows that we can always find values of A and C such that firms are in-
different between being active and not active in this market and between
advertising and non-advertising. On the other hand, the proof also shows
that the restrictions for this equilibrium to hold become easier to be satis-
fied, the larger n. It can be shown that if n increases, β decreases in such a
way that for n going to infinity the number of active firms βn is a constant.
Consequently, the number of inactive firms grows infinitely large. There-
fore, the larger n, the larger the possible difference in expected search cost
between following up on an advertisement and searching for an active firm
among all non-advertising firms.
4 Other equilibria
In the previous section we characterized one of the possible equilibria of our
model. There are however many more equilibria possible even if we restrict
ourselves to cases where both α and β are between 0 and 1. In this section
we will discuss some of the possible forms other equilibria can take and
discuss the reasons why a full characterization is quite difficult indeed.
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In section 3 we derived an equilibrium by following several steps. The first
step is to assume a consumer search strategy. Based on this consumer strat-
egy one can derive an optimal firm strategy. This firm strategy then is used
to check whether the assumed consumer strategy is indeed optimal. This
procedure can also be followed to derive other equilibria. However, con-
sumer behavior for each type of consumer consists of three elements. After
not having received any advertisements, a consumer has to decide whether to
search or not. After having received one or more advertisements, consumers
have to decide whether to search further or not, and whether it would be
profitable to buy from the lowest priced advertising firm or not. This gives
26 possible search behaviors. It would be quite a large task to investigate
all these possibilities. We note that some of these alternative search strate-
gies can be part of an equilibrium where advertised prices are also higher
than non-advertised prices. Take for example the following situation. High
demand consumers who get an advertisement buy immediately from the
lowest priced advertising firm. If a high demand consumers does not receive
an advertisement, he will search for an active firm. Low demand consumers
always search for an active non-advertising firm no matter whether or not
they received an advertisement. In such a situation advertising firms mainly
sell to the high demand consumers, and therefore may choose prices close to
H/2, while non-advertising firms mainly sell to the low demand consumers.
Under some conditions, this search behaviour could indeed give rise to an
equilibrium where advertised prices are higher than non-advertised prices.
The condition H < (1 + 1√
1−γ )L does not need to hold in this equilibrium
as advertising firms will never want to set prices above H/2. It is, of course,
also clear that equilibria with advertised prices below non-advertised prices
exist.
The last remark we would like to make on other equilibrium possibilities is
that price distributions with a ’gap’ are also possible. This could happen if
consumers observing prices close to p
1
buy immediately from an advertising
firm, while consumers observing prices close to p1 as lowest advertised price
first search for another active firm. In this case there is a price p∗ between
p
1
and p1 such that consumers are indifferent between searching and not
searching. Asking a price slightly above p∗ would give less expected sales
and consequently less expected profits than when asking a price slightly
below p∗. However, asking a price that is far enough above p∗ could give
expected profits that equal the expected profits from asking a price slightly
below p∗. As we cannot rule out equilibria of this type a full characterization
of all equilibria is beyond what one possibly could hope to obtain in this
model.
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5 Conclusion
The core of this paper centers around the uncertainty consumers face con-
cerning the shops that carry the product they are looking for: some firms do
have the product, others don’t. This uncertainty is important in explaining
consumer search behaviour, but so far this type of uncertainty has not been
considered in the large literature on consumer search. An important role of
advertising in such a situation is to inform consumers that the advertising
firm indeed sells the product. Advertising therefore can lower consumers’
expected search costs. Since visiting an advertising firm comes with lower
expected search costs than finding the product in a non-advertising firm,
advertising firms have an advantage above non-advertising firms. In this
paper we address the question whether advertising firms can use this advan-
tage to set higher prices. We show that this is indeed the case. This result
is important for empirical work on advertising as it shows that a positive
relation between advertising and prices is not necessarily the result of per-
suasive advertising. Our model makes clear that such a positive relation can
also arise from informative advertising.
We have characterized one equilibrium where advertising firms set higher
prices than non-advertising firms. We have also indicated that there are
other equilibria that have this property and that there are also equilibria
where despite the comparative advantage advertising firms set lower prices
than non-advertising firms.
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Appendix
Proof of lemma 3.2
We will first turn to advertising firms. We first note that F1(p) specified in
the lemma is strictly increasing in p, and F1(p1) = 1. The minimum price
p
1
is defined as the price where F1(p) = 0. These observations make clear
that F1(p) is indeed a cumulative distribution function.
Consumers buy immediately from advertising firms that ask a price at or
below 12(γL+ (1− γ)H). The profit function for these prices therefore is
pi1(p) = p(γ(L− p) + (1− γ)(H − p))(1− αβ + αβ(1− F1(p)))n−1 −A.
The profits are given by the price times the expected sales minus the ad-
vertising costs A. Expected sales are given by (γ(L − p) + (1 − γ)(H −
p))(1 − αβ + αβ(1 − F1(p)))n−1, that is, an advertising firm only sells if
there is no other firm advertising a lower price, which happens with proba-
bility (1−αβ+αβ(1−F1(p)))n−1, and if an advertising firm advertises the
lowest price it sells L − p items to the low demand consumers and H − p
items to the high demand consumers.
For prices between p
1
and p1, inserting the equilibrium cdf F1(p) =
1
αβ −
1−αβ
αβ (
(γL+(1−γ)H)2
4p(γL+(1−γ)H−p))
1
n−1 gives pi1(p) = (1−αβ)n−1 (γL+(1−γ)H)
2
4 −A = pi1.
For prices below p
1
, inserting F1(p) = 0 in the profit function gives pi1(p) =
p(γ(L−p)+(1−γ)(H−p))−A; a function that is increasing in p. Deviating
to a price below p
1
therefore is not profitable.
For F1(p) to be the equilibrium pricing strategy, it also should not be prof-
itable to deviate to higher prices. What could happen when a firm advertises
a price above p1? If there are other advertising firms, consumers will never
buy from the deviating firm. However, with probability (1−αβ)n−1 the de-
viating firm is the only advertising firm, and has a possibility to sell to some
or all consumers. In assumption 3.1 we did not specify the consumer behav-
ior if consumers’ lowest observed advertised price is above 12(γL+(1−γ)H).
This also is not necessary. If the deviation price is below L, the best that can
happen to a firm is that all consumers still buy immediately from the adver-
tising firm. In that case the profits are as specified above, with F1(p) = 1.
This is a parabola with top at p1, so even if consumers would all immediately
buy, deviating is not profitable.
If the deviation price is above L but below H,6 only the high demand con-
sumers possibly buy from the deviating firm. In the best case, all the high
demand consumers buy immediately from the deviating firm. This would
give profits p(1 − γ)(H − p)(1 − αβ)n−1 − A. Note that for p > L > p1,
p(1−γ)(H−p)(1−αβ)n−1−A > p(γ(L−p)+(1−γ)(H−p))(1−αβ)n−1−A,
6It is clear that deviating to a price above H is never optimal.
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so in this case it is possible that deviating is profitable. Maximum profits
are obtained when the price is set to 12H, and the profits from deviating then
are 14H
2(1− γ)(1− αβ)n−1 −A. For F1(p) to be an equilibrium strategy, it
has to be the case that
1
4
H2(1− γ)(1− αβ)n−1 −A < (1− αβ)n−1 (γL+ (1− γ)H)
2
4
−A,
or
H < (1 +
1√
1− γ )L. (1)
We now turn to the behavior of non-advertising firms. Given the search
strategy specified, non-advertising firms only sell when no other firm is ac-
tive and advertises. Moreover, they will never sell to high demand consumers
as these consumers never search. Low demand consumers who get no ad-
vertisements, on the other hand, search for an active firm. So, the expected
profits for a non-advertising firm asking a price at or below 12L are
pi0(p) = γp(L− p)(1− αβ)n−1 1
1 + (n− 1)β(1−α)1−αβ
.
The low demand consumers give a profit γp(L − p), but only if no firm
advertises, what happens with probability (1− αβ)n−1, and profits have to
be shared between all active non-advertising firms. The expected number of
active non-advertising firms is (n− 1) times the probability a firm is active
and non-advertising, conditional on the fact that no firm advertises. This
conditional probability is given by β(1−α)1−αβ . From the profit function it is easy
to see that it is optimal for non-advertising firms to set p0 = 12L. A firm
that deviates to a higher price will in the best case still sell to all consumers
who search for it. This would give expected profits equal to the expression
given above, which is a parabola with top at 12L. Deviating therefore is not
profitable.
The last thing we have to show is that in equilibrium α and β are implicitly
defined by (1 − αβ)n−1 = 4(C+A)
(γL+(1−γ)H)2 and γL
2 C+A
(γL+(1−γ)H)2 = C + C(n −
1)β(1−α)1−αβ . These two equalities originate from the requirement that pi0 = C
and pi1 = C, such that firms are indifferent between advertising and not
advertising, and indifferent between being active and being inactive.
2
Proof of lemma 3.3
The first condition we have to impose is that it is optimal for low demand
consumers who get an advertisement with price at or below p1 to not search,
but buy immediately from the lowest priced advertising firm even if this is
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the highest price advertised. Consumers are willing to buy if the advertised
price is below their valuation for the product, that is,
p1 < L, (2)
which reduces to H < 2−γ1−γL, and if their surplus from buying is above the
search costs they have to make to visit the advertising firm, that is,
1
2
(L− p1)2 > cL. (3)
Note that the surplus from buying is the area above the price p1 and below
the demand function L− p.
The low demand consumers who get an advertisement are not willing to
search if the expected surplus from searching is below the surplus from
buying immediately. The expected surplus from searching depends on the
number of firms that have not yet been searched. Denote by Sk the expected
surplus from searching if there are k firms yet to be searched. The probability
a consumer finds an active firm conditional on the firm not having sent
an advertisement is given by (1−α)β1−αβ . With the remaining probability, the
consumer does not find an active firm. In this case a consumer can decide
to search on, giving expected surplus Sk−1, or to buy from the lowest priced
advertising firm, asking price p∗1. Combining this, and taking into account
that all non-advertising firms ask a single price p0, we get
Sk = −cL+ (1− α)β1− αβ
1
2
(L−p0)2+(1− (1− α)β1− αβ )max(Sk−1,
1
2
(L−p∗1)2−cL)
and in particular
S1 = −cL + (1− α)β1− αβ
1
2
(L− p0)2 + (1− (1− α)β1− αβ )(
1
2
(L− p∗1)2 − cL).
We note that if S1 > 12(L − p∗1)2 − cL (that is, if there is only one firm to
be searched, it is profitable to search instead of buying immediately at the
advertising firm) then S2 > S1 > 12(L−p∗1)2−cL, S3 > S2 > 12(L−p∗1)2−cL,
S4 > S3 >
1
2(L− p∗1)2− cL, and so on. So whenever S1 > 12(L− p∗1)2− cL, it
is always profitable to search until one active non-advertising firm is found.
Furthermore, if S1 < 12(L − p∗1)2 − cL, then S2 = S1 < 12(L − p∗1)2 − cL,
S3 = S2 < 12(L− p∗1)2 − cL and so on. So whenever S1 < 12(L− p∗1)2 − cL, it
is never profitable to search.
Low demand consumers who get an advertisement should not be willing to
search even if they only observe the highest price that possibly is advertised,
leading to the restriction
14
−cL+(1− α)β
1− αβ
1
2
(L−p0)2+(1− (1− α)β1− αβ )(
1
2
(L−p1)2−cL) <
1
2
(L−p1)2−cL.
(4)
For high demand consumers we have the same kind of restrictions. High
demand consumers who get an advertisement also do not search on but buy
immediately. This gives
1
2
(H − p1)2 > cH (5)
and
−cH+(1− α)β
1− αβ
1
2
(H−p0)2+(1−(1− α)β1− αβ )(
1
2
(H−p1)2−cH) <
1
2
(H−p1)2−cH .
(6)
There are two more restrictions on consumer search. Low demand consumers
who get no advertisements search for an active firm. Expected surplus from
searching is the same as the expected surplus from searching after having
received one or more ads, except that max(Sk−1, 12(L−p∗1)2−cL) is replaced
by max(Sk−1, 0). The analysis is the same; in particular, if S1 = −cL +
(1−α)β
1−αβ
1
2(L − p0)2 > 0 then it is profitable to search until finding an active
firm. If S1 < 0, if is not profitable to search at all. This gives
(1− α)β
1− αβ
1
2
(L− p0)2 − cL > 0. (7)
In contrast, high demand consumers who get no advertisements do not
search, giving restriction
(1− α)β
1− αβ
1
2
(H − p0)2 − cH < 0. (8)
The three restrictions on the low type of consumers can be written as re-
strictions on cL. This gives
cL <
1
2
(L− γL+ (1− γ)H
2
)2,
cL <
1
2
(1− α)β
1− αβ (L−
1
2
L)2
and
cL >
(1− α)β
1− β
1
2
(L− 1
2
L)2 − (1− α)β
1− β
1
2
(L− γL+ (1− γ)H
2
)2.
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This is only possible if (1−α)β1−β
1
2(L − 12L)2 − (1−α)β1−β 12(L − γL+(1−γ)H2 )2 <
1
2(L− γL+(1−γ)H2 )2, and in that case 12(L− γL+(1−γ)H2 )2 > 12 (1−α)β1−αβ (L− 12L)2.
So restrictions (3), (4) and (7) are equivalent to
(1− α)β
1− β
1
2
(L−1
2
L)2−(1− α)β
1− β
1
2
(L−γL+ (1− γ)H
2
)2 < cL <
1
2
(1− α)β
1− αβ (L−
1
2
L)2.
(9)
Thus, we can find a value of cL that satisfies these inequalities if
1− αβ
(1− α)β >
(L− 12L)2
(L− γL+(1−γ)H2 )2
. (10)
Similarly, for the high demand consumer. The three relevant restrictions
only hold if 12(H− γL+(1−γ)H2 )2 > (1−α)β1−αβ 12(H− 12L)2, which can be rewritten
as (1−α)β1−αβ
1
2(H − 12L)2 > (1−α)β1−β 12(H − 12L)2− (1−α)β1−β 12(H − γL+(1−γ)H2 )2. The
three restrictions are equivalent then to require
(1− α)β
1− αβ
1
2
(H − 1
2
L)2 < cH <
1
2
(H − γL+ (1− γ)H
2
)2, (11)
which can hold only if
1− αβ
(1− α)β >
(H − 12L)2
(H − γL+(1−γ)H2 )2
. (12)
As the RHS of this inequality is smaller than the RHS of (10), this inequality
always holds when (10) holds. Moreover, note that the lower bound on cH is
larger than the upper bound on cL, so the condition cL < cH is automatically
satisfied.
2
Proof of proposition 3.4
To begin with, we note that 1+ 1√
1−γ <
2−γ
1−γ . This implies that the condition
H < 2−γ1−γL that is necessary for the consumer search strategy to be optimal,
is automatically satisfied whenever the condition H < (1 + 1√
1−γ )L, needed
for the firm strategy to be optimal, is satisfied.
We restate the respective equilibrium conditions α and β have to satisfy: (1−
αβ)n−1 = 4(C+A)
(γL+(1−γ)H)2 and γL
2 C+A
(γL+(1−γ)H)2 = C + C(n− 1)β(1−α)1−αβ . Using
this last equilibrium condition we can reformulate the condition 1−αβ(1−α)β >
(L− 1
2
L)2
(L− γL+(1−γ)H
2
)2
needed to guarantee the optimality of the consumer search
strategy in lemma 3.3 fully in terms of exogenous parameter values:
(n− 1)C [γL+ (1− γ)H]2
γ(A+ C)L2 − C [γL+ (1− γ)H]2 >
(L− 12L)2
(L− γL+(1−γ)H2 )2
,
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or
(C +A)
(γL+ (1− γ)H)2 <
C
γL2
(
1 + (n− 1)(L−
γL+(1−γ)H
2 )
2
(L− 12L)2
)
. (13)
We define x as x = 4(C+A)
(γL+(1−γ)H)2 and note that x > 0. We can now write
(1− αβ)n−1 = x
and
β(1− α) = γL
2
4C(n− 1)x
n
n−1 − 1
n− 1x
1
n−1 .
From the equations above we can then isolate α and β as
β = 1 +
γL2
4C(n− 1)x
n
n−1 − n
n− 1x
1
n−1
and
α =
1− x 1n−1
β
=
1− x 1n−1
1 + γL
2
4C(n−1)x
n
n−1 − nn−1x
1
n−1
.
Using these expressions, restrictions 0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1 can be
rewritten as follows:
α > 0⇐⇒ x < 1;
α < 1⇐⇒ 1− x 1n−1 < 1 + γL
2
4C(n− 1)x
n
n−1 − n
n− 1x
1
n−1 ⇐⇒
−1 < γL
2
4C(n− 1)x−
n
n− 1 ⇐⇒ γL
2x > 4C;
β < 1⇐⇒ γL
2
4C(n− 1)x
n
n−1 − n
n− 1x
1
n−1 < 0⇐⇒ γL2x < 4nC
β > 0⇐⇒ x 1n−1 ( γL
2
(n− 1)4Cx−
n
n− 1) > −1
It is not difficult to see that when the first three restrictions are satisfied,
the last restriction also holds. To see this, note that the first restriction
implies that x
1
n−1 < 1. The second and third restriction together yield
−1 < γL2(n−1)4Cx− nn−1 < 0 , and so x
1
n−1 ( γL
2
(n−1)4Cx− nn−1) > −1 . Using the
definition of x, we can thus rewrite 0 < α, β < 1 as
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CγL2
<
(C +A)
(γL+ (1− γ)H)2 < min(
1
4
,
nC
γL2
). (14)
As n >
(
1 + (n− 1) (L−
γL+(1−γ)H
2
)2
(L− 1
2
L)2
)
, conditions (13) and (14) can be com-
bined to
C
γL2
<
(C +A)
(γL+ (1− γ)H)2 < min(
1
4
,
C
γL2
(
1 + (n− 1)(L−
γL+(1−γ)H
2 )
2
(L− 12L)2
)
).
(15)
These inequalities can only be satisfied if C
γL2
< 14 . On the other hand, it
is easy to see that the term in the middle is increasing in A and that for
A = 0, the middle terms is smaller than the LHS. Therefore, if C
γL2
< 14 ,
one can always find a value of A > 0 such that both inequalities in (15) are
satisfied.
2
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